Summary of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice By David Galula Summary written by Brett Reeder, Conflict Research Consortium Citation: Galula, . WARFARE. Theory and Practice. David Galula. Foreword by John A. Nagl. PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era. Praeger Security International. Westport. operations citing David Galula’s theory. In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and. Practice, Galula sets a clear mark for planning future COIN.
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Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of couhterinsurgency insurgents. Find out what you can do to help society more constructively handle the intractable conflicts that are making so many problems insoluble. A successful insurgency requires a viable cause to rally support.
Though potentially quite effective, such action can backfire and anger the general population. Galula’s work on counter-insurgency is in large part based on the experiences and lesson of years of French colonial warfare, most notably the work of Joseph-Simon Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey.
Counterinsurgency Warfare by David Galula – Praeger – ABC-CLIO
Inhe was expelled from the French officer corps, in accordance with the Statute on Jews of the Vichy State. In it, Galula, a French military officer with experience in China, Greece, Southeast Warfafe, and Algeria, seeks to provide a “compass” for the counterinsurgent, much as Mao did for the revolutionary. Counterinsurgecny conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, cohnterinsurgency industrial resources, etc.
But decisive action does not necessarily mean military action. Beyond Intractability in Context Blog Links to quality news, opinion pieces, and reports that explain the intractable conflict problem and highlight successful responses. While the book is primarily concerned with insurgency, it often refers to both revolutions and plots as well.
Summary of “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”
He died in of lung cancer. The Intractable Conflict Challenge Find out what you can do to help society more constructively handle the intractable conflicts that are making so many problems insoluble. Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy’s rear. Lessons learned should then be rapidly applied to subsequent areas.
At the heart of this political machine is the development of a counterinsurgent cause to compete with the insurgent cause.
When this is the case, the essential problem for the counterinsurgency is that the “actual danger will always appear to the nation as out of proportion to the demands made by an adequate response” p 4. In some ways, this aids a counterinsurgency because the “moral fog” surrounding the insurgents dissipates and the counterinsurgency is free to act more decisively. While insurgencies often fail on their own accord, “Relying on luck Keeping this emphasis on political action and the laws of counterinsurgency in mind, Galula develops a comprehensive strategy for dealing effectively with hot insurgencies.
Summary of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Such programs are often counterinsurgsncy on reason, and will be relatively ineffective in the early stages of an insurgency when “passion is the prime mover,” but as the conflict progresses counterinsurgwncy the pragmatic implications of the war become the “the prime mover,” rational programs which improve the lives of the populace will become highly persuasive.
New to the site? While a revolution is a sudden and “accidental” mass movement and a plot or coup is an intentional effort to overthrow the top leadership in a swift action, an insurgency is intentional, but not swift. A key characteristic of all three types of revolutionary warfare is their inherent asymmetry. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support of the active leaders. According to Galula, this coordination can be achieved through committees and integrated military-civilian hierarchies but, “more than anything else, a doctrine appears to be the practical answer to the problem of how to channel efforts in a single direction” p Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.
Counterinsurgency Warfare, David Galula | Brendan Kelly –
Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Such direct action should only be attempted when the insurgent’s cause in not popular, the counterinsurgent has the legal authority to act, and significant publicity of such action can be prevented.
Rather, action should be taken in select areas, and resources moved as needed. Indeed, a counterinsurgency exists only in reaction to an insurgency.
Galula has been considered an important theorist by contemporary defence experts. Galula cites Mao Zedong ‘s observation that “[R]evolutionary war is 80 percent political action and only 20 percent military”, and proposes four “laws” for counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice in Such support is most readily obtained from an cavid minority. The older soldier imparted an intellectual approach to military and geopolitical analysis.