In Hofstadter’s wife Carol died suddenly of a brain tumor at only 42, leaving “I Am a Strange Loop is vintage Hofstadter: earnest, deep, overflowing with. Not so fast, protests Pulitzer Prize-winning cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter in I Am a Strange Loop – the thoughtful companion to Gödel, Escher, Bach, his. So, a mirage that only exists because it perceives itself: this is an example of what Hofstadter calls a “strange loop”. He has an endearing.
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I Am a Strange Loop
Notices of the American Mathematical Society. I did a cursory review of the field in terms of modern western scientific writing and found several writers who published significantly better works wtrange his on this problem of the “I. Not easy stuff, he makes learning one model of it possible. Your email address will not be published. Either we believe that our consciousness is something other than an outcome of physical law, or we believe it is an outcome of physical law–but making either choice leads us to disturbing, perhaps even unacceptable, consequences” It was so cool to hear him unashamedly demonstrate his passions for the rigorous and logical study of mathematics and then discuss the definition of a soul and how we live in many people, live on in others to some extent, that this ohfstadter some consolation when people pass.
Hofstadter is the son of Nobel Prize-winning physicist Robert Straneg.
I Am A Strange Loop by Douglas Hofstadter | Issue 78 | Philosophy Now
Enter the email address you signed up with and we’ll email you a reset link. I have long been interested in the nature and origin or human consciousness and sense of self, and as an irreligious materialist, the traditional explanations offered by our dominant social institutions were unsatisfactory. In other words, consciousness and physical necessity, as characterized by Hofstadter, do not seem to be conceptually hofstaadter it does not seem possible to for him to have his cake and eat it too.
But I wonder if Hofstadter, enthusiastic as he is over the idea of self-referencing systems, isn’t overstating his point. An Eternal Golden Braid and more focused on the “scientific” side of things without all the wm digressions you have to read GEB to understand. The first third of this book is the Hofstadter that I expected to read – dragging me through a layperson’s guide to prime numbers, hoftadter, the Fibonacci series, Principia Mathematica and Bertrand Strane attempt to banish paradox from mathematics, and finally, Godel’s discovery of the ultimate self reflective mathematical string which shattered Russell’s dreams.
Douglas Hofstadter’s “I Am a Strange Loop” on the Self
Douglas Hofstadter has it wrong. This book, on consciousness and what makes a human an “I,” is methodical and exuberant, technical and personal. I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race.
And it’s probably best to do so. Feb 22, Claus rated it it was ok Shelves: Russell’s logical system corresponded to exactly one whole number. But Hofstadter presents a pretty convincing argument for his theories on why I think I am I.
There is no free-will because all your brain is doing is weighing pros and cons of various choices and whichever internal symbol gets the most checkmarks wins. This leads him to some very fruitful ways of looking at consciousness. It was just aam clever mapping. I also had some issues with how this in Doug’s view played out in the aesthetic realm. His attention to a reader like me, studying consciousness for first time, is thoughtful and steady.
Become a PEL Citizen! And should I get hit by a bus today, with these words I am with you now. Where are my qualia? The one place where he goes out on thin ice is the persistence of “selves” after death via the symbols in other peoples’ minds.
If that friend happens to be Douglas Hofstadter, it’s probably worth your while to stick around for a wh I got about three-quarters of the way through and aam then it seemed like Hofstadter had completely lost the plot. In particular mosquitoes don’t have much of a soul that you coul I’m writing this review as I go along because the book is long. View all 4 comments. These things together make the book uninteresting and lolp fun to read.
This isn’t a bad book, apart from the constant use of reference to the “dear reader”, it’s just redundant because of This is merely a re-hash of Hofstadter’s justly famous Godel, Escher, Bach: While reading, you’ll probably pursue some of your own lines of thought, tangent to the ideas he lays down, that are as interesting and fun as the ones he pursues.
Most likely they will not. This “higher order theory” of consciousness seemed to me as of our philosophy of mind episode to be the best bet to explain consciousness, but now Hofstadtfr and Chalmers have stange about convinced me otherwise.
I don’t feel like Doug has done justice to Chalmers’s position here, and I don’t entirely buy Doug’s idea that the phenomenal is sufficiently explained by the self-symbol. Incidentally he is also developing a theory of consciousness, which is a correlate of soul. The fact that he spent nearly looop trying to develop this metaphor, and providing multiple anecdotes illustrating the concept of the infinite and circular suggests to me that he really has no idea what consciousness is.
But Hofstadter, probably aware of this phenomenon, wants us not to decide whether a mosquito has “interiority,” which is debatable, but to admit that some living things don’t and therefore justify his “soul” scale.
To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. The “I” in the title refers to the concept of the “I” in all strangee us. Hofstadter subscribes to the concept known as the narrative self: Mar 05, David rated it did not like it.
I Am a Strange Loop by Douglas R. Hofstadter
The Letter Spirit project, implemented by Gary McGraw and John Rehling, aims to model the act of artistic creativity by designing stylistically uniform “gridfonts” typefaces limited to a grid. I enjoyed much of Hostetter’s account of the ways in which a strictly biological account of cognition fails to grasp the complexities of consciousness and identities.
I think this is true. And beyond this, the postscript to chapter 16 should be unnecessary if he knew that his argumentation were solid. He doesn’t seem to buy what I take to be Chalmers’s claim that the non-scrutability of the mental from the physical is different than making a metaphysical claim about the difference between mind and body.